Portland State University

PDXScholar
Computer Science Faculty Publications and
Presentations

Computer Science

5-2015

Micro-Policies: Formally Verified, Tag-Based Security
Monitors
Arthur Azevedo de Amorim
University of Pennsylvania

Maxime Denes
Inria Paris-Rocquencour

Nick Giannarakis
ENS Cachan

Cătălin Hriţcu
Inria Paris-Rocquencour

Benjamin C. Pierce
University of Pennsylvania

See next page for additional authors
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/compsci_fac
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, and the Computer Sciences Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Citation Details
Azevedo de Amorim, Arthur; Denes, Maxime; Giannarakis, Nick; Hriţcu, Cătălin; Pierce, Benjamin C.;
Spector-Zabusky, Antal; and Tolmach, Andrew, "Micro-Policies: Formally Verified, Tag-Based Security
Monitors" (2015). Computer Science Faculty Publications and Presentations. 145.
https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/compsci_fac/145

This Post-Print is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Computer Science
Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can
make this document more accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

Authors
Arthur Azevedo de Amorim, Maxime Denes, Nick Giannarakis, Cătălin Hriţcu, Benjamin C. Pierce, Antal
Spector-Zabusky, and Andrew Tolmach

This post-print is available at PDXScholar: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/compsci_fac/145

Micro-Policies
Formally Verified, Tag-Based Security Monitors
Arthur Azevedo de Amorim1,2 Maxime Dénès1,2 Nick Giannarakis2,3,4 Cătălin Hriţcu2
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Abstract—Recent advances in hardware design have demonstrated mechanisms allowing a wide range of low-level security policies (or micro-policies) to be expressed using rules on
metadata tags. We propose a methodology for defining and
reasoning about such tag-based reference monitors in terms of
a high-level “symbolic machine,” and we use this methodology
to define and formally verify micro-policies for dynamic sealing,
compartmentalization, control-flow integrity, and memory safety;
in addition, we show how to use the tagging mechanism to
protect its own integrity. For each micro-policy, we prove by
refinement that the symbolic machine instantiated with the
policy’s rules embodies a high-level specification characterizing a
useful security property. Last, we show how the symbolic machine
itself can be implemented in terms of a hardware rule cache and
a software controller.
Index Terms—security; dynamic enforcement; reference monitors; low-level code; tagged hardware architecture; metadata;
formal verification; refinement; machine-checked proofs; Coq;
dynamic sealing; compartmentalization; isolation; least privilege;
memory safety; control-flow integrity
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Introduction

Today’s computer systems are distressingly insecure. However,
many of their vulnerabilities can be avoided if low-level code
is constrained to obey sensible safety and security properties.
Ideally, such properties might be enforced statically, but for
obtaining pervasive guarantees all the way to the level of
running machine code it is often more practical to detect
violations dynamically using a reference monitor [3], [13],
[29]. Monitors have been used for many tasks, including
enforcement of memory safety [27] or control-flow integrity
(CFI) [1], taint tracking, fine-grained information-flow control
(IFC), and isolation of untrusted code [33], [35]. They are
sometimes implemented in software [13], but this can significantly degrade performance and/or cause designers to settle for
rough approximations of the intended policy that are potentially
vulnerable to attack [10], [14]. Hardware acceleration is thus an
attractive alternative, especially in an era of cheap transistors.
Many designs for hardware monitors have been proposed,
with early designs focusing on enforcing single, hard-wired
security policies [30] and later ones evolving toward more
programmable mechanisms that allow quicker adaptation to a
shifting attack landscape. Recent work has gone yet further
in this direction by defining a generic, fully programmable
hardware/software architecture for tag-based monitoring on a
conventional processor extended with a Programmable Unit
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for Metadata Processing (PUMP) [11].
The PUMP architecture associates each piece of data in
the system with a metadata tag describing its provenance
or purpose (e.g., “this is an instruction,” “this came from
the network,” “this is secret,” “this is sealed with key k”),
propagates this metadata as instructions are executed, and
checks that policy rules are obeyed throughout the computation.
It provides great flexibility for defining policies and puts no
arbitrary limitations on the size of the metadata and the number
of policies supported. Hardware simulations show [11] that
an Alpha processor extended with PUMP hardware achieves
performance comparable to dedicated hardware when simultaneously enforcing memory safety, CFI, and taint tracking on a
standard benchmark suite. Monitoring imposes modest impact
on runtime (typically under 10%) and power ceiling (less than
10%), in return for some increase in energy usage (typically
under 60%) and chip area (110%).
Coding correct, efficient policies to run on the PUMP architecture can be nontrivial. Indeed, it is often challenging
even to give a high-level specification for a policy of interest.
In prior work, we showed how to address this challenge for
one specific policy by giving a mechanized correctness proof
for an information-flow control (IFC) policy running on an
idealized machine incorporating PUMP-like hardware [4]. This
proof is organized around three layers of machines sharing
a common core instruction set: an abstract machine whose
instruction semantics has a specific IFC policy built in; an
intermediate symbolic machine that allows for different dynamic
IFC mechanisms to be expressed using a simple domainspecific language; and a concrete machine, where the IFC
policy is implemented by a software controller that interacts
with low-level tag-management mechanisms of the hardware. A
noninterference property is established at the abstract machine
level and transferred to the other levels via two steps of
refinement.
In this paper, we extend this IFC-specific proof to a generic
framework for formalizing and verifying arbitrary policies
enforceable by the PUMP architecture. We use the term micropolicies for such instruction-level security-monitoring mechanisms based on fine-grained metadata. We use this methodology
to formalize and verify a diverse collection of micro-policies
using the Coq proof assistant.
The heart of our methodology is a generic symbolic machine
(middle layer in Figure 1) that serves both as a programming
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Figure 1. System overview

interface—abstracting away unnecessary implementation details and providing a convenient platform for micro-policy
designers—and as an intermediate step in correctness proofs.
This machine is parameterized by a symbolic micro-policy that
expresses tag propagation and checking in terms of structured
mathematical objects rather than low-level concrete representations. Each symbolic micro-policy consists of (i) sets of
metadata tags that are used to label every piece of data in
the machine’s memory and registers (including the program
counter); (ii) a transfer function that uses both the current
opcode and the tags on the pc, on the current instruction, and on
the instruction operands to determine whether the operation is
permitted and, if it is, to specify how the pc and the instruction’s
result should be tagged in the next machine state; and (iii) a
set of monitor services that can be invoked by user code. For
example, in a micro-policy for dynamic sealing (a languagebased protection mechanism in the style of perfect symmetric
encryption [23], described below in §4) the set of tags used
for registers and memory might be {Data, Key k, Sealed k},
where Data is used to tag ordinary data values, Sealed k is
used to tag values sealed with the key k, and Key k denotes
a key that can be used for sealing and unsealing values. The
transfer function for this micro-policy would allow, for example,
arithmetic operations on values tagged Data but deny them on
data tagged Sealed or Key. Monitor services are provided to
allow user programs to create new keys and to seal and unseal
data values with given keys.
We instantiate this symbolic machine with a diverse set
of security micro-policies: (a) dynamic sealing [23], [31];
(b) compartmentalization, which sandboxes untrusted code and
allows it to be run alongside trusted code [32]; (c) control-flow
integrity (CFI), which prevents code-reuse attacks such as
return-oriented programming [1]; and (d) memory safety, which
prevents temporal and spatial violations for heap-allocated
data [11]. The intended behavior of each micro-policy is
specified by an abstract machine (top layer in Figure 1), which
gives a clear characterization of the micro-policy’s behavior
as seen by a user-level programmer. The abstract machine
enforces the invariants of the micro-policy by omitting insecure
behaviors from its transition function: a program that violates
the micro-policy gets stuck. Where appropriate, we prove

that the abstract machine for a micro-policy satisfies standard
properties from the literature. For example, for the CFI micropolicy we prove a variant of the original CFI property proposed
by Abadi et al. [1], while for our compartmentalization micropolicy we prove a single-step property drawn from Wahbe et
al.’s original software fault isolation (SFI) model [32]. For
each micro-policy, we prove backward refinement between the
abstract and symbolic machines, i.e., every possible symbolic
machine behavior is a valid abstract behavior—hence, the
symbolic machine always fail-stops on policy violations.
Finally, we extend this methodology to the hardware level
by showing how instances of the symbolic machine can be
realized on a low-level concrete machine, a minimalist RISC
ISA extended with the key mechanisms of the PUMP hardware
architecture [11] (bottom layer in Figure 1). Every word of
data in this machine is associated with a piece of metadata
called a tag—itself a full machine word that can, in particular,
hold a pointer to an arbitrary data structure in memory. The
interpretation of tags is left entirely to software; the hardware
simply propagates tags from operands to results according to
software-defined concrete rules. To propagate tags efficiently,
the processor is augmented with a rule cache that operates
in parallel with instruction execution. On a rule cache miss,
control is transferred to a trusted miss handler which, given the
tags of the instruction’s arguments, decides whether the current
operation should be allowed and, if so, computes appropriate
tags for its results. It then adds this set of argument and
result tags to the rule cache so that when the same situation
is encountered in the future, the rule can be applied without
slowing down the processor.
Each micro-policy can be implemented at the concrete
level by providing machine code for the transfer function
and monitor services, along with a concrete bit-encoding for
symbolic tags. This monitor code can make use of a handful
of privileged instructions of the concrete machine, allowing
it to inspect and change tags and to update the cache. For all
micro-policies, it is obviously necessary to protect the integrity
of the monitor’s code and data, and to prevent user programs
from invoking the privileged instructions. We show that we
can achieve this protection using only the tagging mechanism
itself (no special kernel protection modes, page table tricks,
etc.). We also give a generic proof of backward refinement
between the symbolic and concrete machines, modulo some
assumptions characterizing the behavior of the micro-policyspecific concrete code. Composing this refinement with the
abstract-symbolic refinement described above gives a proof that
the concrete machine always fail-stops on policy violations. For
CFI, we additionally show that the corresponding higher-level
property [1] is preserved by refinement, allowing us to transfer
it to any valid implementation of the micro-policy.
Our focus throughout is on proving safety properties, which
we formalize as backward refinements: the observable behaviors
of the lower-level machine are also legal behaviors of the
higher-level machine, and in particular the lower-level machine
fail-stops whenever the higher-level machine does. Liveness,
or forward refinement (the lower-level machine only fail-stops

when the higher-level one does), is also a desirable property;
indeed, a completely inert machine (i.e., one that never steps)
at the symbolic or concrete level would satisfy backward
refinement but would be of no use. However, full forward
refinement doesn’t always hold for our micro-policies. In
particular, resource constraints that we prefer to ignore at the
abstract level (e.g., word size and memory capacity) become
visible at the symbolic or concrete level when tags and monitor
data structures are made explicit. Fortunately, in practice it is
reasonable to check that the lower-level machines are “live
enough” by testing.
Our main contributions are as follows. First, we introduce a
generic symbolic machine (§2-§3) for conveniently defining and
effectively verifying a wide range of micro-policies for a simple
RISC processor. Second, we use the symbolic machine to give
formal descriptions and verified tag-based implementations of
four security micro-policies: dynamic sealing (§4), compartmentalization (§5), control-flow integrity (§6), and memory
safety (§7). Third, we define a concrete machine incorporating
a PUMP cache (§8) and sketch how to construct concrete
monitors implementing symbolic micro-policies. And finally
(§9), we give a generic construction showing how tags can be
used to protect the concrete monitor itself from attack, together
with a generic proof (parameterized by some assumptions about
the micro-policy-specific monitor code) that this construction is
correct. We discuss related work specific to each micro-policy in
the relevant section (§4–§7), saving more general related work
on micro-policies and reference monitors for §10. We outline
future work in §11. The appendices present additional technical
details; further details can be in a long version, available
electronically.

mem[pc] = i
decode i = Binop⊕ r1 r2 rd
reg[r1 ]=w1
reg[r2 ]=w2
reg0 =reg[rd ←w1 ⊕ w2 ]
(mem, reg, pc) → (mem, reg0 , pc+1)
(B INOP)
Let’s read this rule in detail. Looking up the memory word
at address pc yields the word i, which should correspond to
some instruction (i.e., an element of the inst set defined above)
via partial function decode. In this case, that instruction is
Binop⊕ r1 r2 rd . Registers r1 and r2 contain the operands
w1 and w2 . The notation reg[rd ←w1 ⊕ w2 ] denotes a partial
function that maps rd to w1 ⊕ w2 and behaves like reg on
all other arguments. The next machine state is calculated by
updating the register file, incrementing the pc, and leaving the
memory unchanged.
The step rule for the Store instruction is similar. (The notation mem[wp ←ws ] is defined only when mem[wp ] is defined;
i.e., it fails if wp is not a legal address in mem. This ensures
that the set of addressable memory locations remains fixed as
the machine steps.)
mem[pc] = i
decode i = Store rp rs
reg[rp ]=wp
reg[rs ]=ws
mem0 =mem[wp ←ws ]
(S TORE)
(mem, reg, pc) → (mem0 , reg, pc+1)
Subroutine calls are implemented by the Jal instruction, which
saves the return address to a general-purpose register ra . Returns
from subroutines are just Jumps through the ra register.
mem[pc] = i
decode i = Jal r
reg[r] = pc0
reg0 = reg[ra ←pc+1]
(mem, reg, pc) → (mem, reg0 , pc0 )
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(JAL)

Symbolic Machine

The symbolic machine is the keystone of our methodology,
embodying our micro-policy programming model. It allows
We begin by introducing the simplified RISC instruction set micro-policies to be expressed and reasoned about in terms of
architecture that forms the common core of all the machines high-level programs written in Gallina, Coq’s internal functional
throughout the paper. This basic machine has a fixed word size programming language, abstracting away irrelevant details
and a fixed set of general-purpose registers plus a program about how they are implemented on concrete low-level hardcounter (pc) register. It features a small collection of familiar ware and providing an appropriate level of abstraction for
reasoning about their security properties. In this section, we give
instructions
just the bare definition of the symbolic machine; §4 illustrates
inst ::= Nop | Const i rd | Mov rs rd | Binop⊕ r1 r2 rd
how its features are used.
Load rp rd | Store rp rs | Jump r | Jal r | Bnz r i | Halt
The symbolic machine shares the same general organization
where ⊕ ∈ {+, −, ×, =, ≤, . . .}. Const i rd puts a constant as the basic machine from §2. Its definition is abstracted
i into register rd . Mov rs rd copies the contents of rs into on several parameters that are provided by the micro-policy
rd . Jump and Jal (jump-and-link) are unconditional indirect designer, collectively forming a symbolic micro-policy: (1) A
jumps, while Bnz r i branches to a fixed offset i (relative to collection of symbolic tags, which are used to label instructions
the current pc) if register r is nonzero. Each instruction is and data. (2) A partial function transfer, which is invoked on
encoded in a word.
each step of the machine to propagate tags from the current
A basic machine state is a tuple (mem, reg, pc) of a word- machine state to the next one. (3) A partial function get service
addressable memory mem (a partial function from words to mapping addresses to pairs of a symbolic monitor service (a
words), a register file reg (a function from register names to partial function on machine states) and a symbolic tag that
words), and a pc value (a word). Note that the memory is a can be used to restrict access to that service. (4) A type EX of
partial function; trying to address outside of the valid memory extra machine state for use by the monitor services, plus an
(by trying to fetch the next instruction from an invalid address, initial value for this extra state.
or loading from or storing to one) halts the machine. A typical
Symbolic states (mem, reg, pc, extra) consist of a memory,
step rule for this machine is written like this:
a register file, a program counter, and a piece of extra state.

2

Basic Machine

The memory, registers, and pc hold symbolic atoms written
w@t, where w (the “payload”) is a machine word and t is
a symbolic tag. The tag parts are not separately addressable;
they are only accessible to the transfer function and monitor
services, not to user programs.1
The symbolic step rules call the transfer function to decide
whether the step is allowed by the micro-policy and, if so,
how the tags should be updated in the next machine state. The
transfer function is passed a 6-tuple containing the current
opcode plus the tags from the current pc, current instruction,
and the inputs to the current instruction (up to three, depending
on the opcode). It returns a pair containing a tag for the next
pc and a tag for the instruction’s result, if any. For example,
here is the symbolic rule for the Binop instruction:
mem[wpc ] = i@ti
decode i = Binop⊕ r1 r2 rd
reg[r1 ]=w1 @t1
reg[r2 ]=w2 @t2
reg[rd ]= @td
transfer(Binop⊕ , tpc , ti , t1 , t2 , td ) = (t0pc , t0d )
(B INOP)
reg0 = reg[rd ←(w1 ⊕ w2 )@t0d ]
(mem, reg, wpc @tpc , extra) → (mem, reg0 , (wpc +1)@t0pc , extra)
As in the basic machine, looking up the memory word at
address wpc (the payload part of the current pc value) yields
the atom i@ti ; decoding its payload part yields the instruction
Binop⊕ r1 r2 rd . Registers r1 and r2 contain the operands w1
and w2 , with tags t1 and t2 , and the current tag on the result
register rd is td . The payload part of the current contents of rd
doesn’t matter, since it’s about to be overwritten; we indicate
this with the wildcard pattern . Passing all these tags to the
transfer function yields tags t0pc and t0d for the next pc and the
new contents of rd . Since transfer is a partial function, it may
not return anything at all for a given 6-tuple of opcode and
tags. If it doesn’t—i.e., if the next step would cause a policy
violation—then none of the step rules will apply and the current
machine state will be stuck. (For simplicity, we assume here that
policy violations are fatal; various error-recovery mechanisms
could also be used [16], [21].) Passing td , the tag on the old
contents of the target register, to the transfer function allows it
to see what kind of data is being overwritten. This information
is useful for implementing dynamic information-flow policies
like “no sensitive upgrade” [4].
To illustrate how a transfer function might behave, consider
how the symbolic machine might be used to implement a
very simple taint-propagation micro-policy. Symbolic tags are
drawn from the set {>, ⊥}, representing tainted and untainted
values. The transfer function is written to ensure that, on each
step of the machine, any result that is influenced by tainted
values is itself tainted. E.g., it might include this clause for
the Binop opcode
transfer(Binop⊕ , tpc , −, t1 , t2 , −) = (tpc , t1 ∨ t2 )
where t1 ∨ t2 denotes the max of t1 and t2 , where ⊥ < >. For
this policy, the ti and td tags don’t matter, which we indicate
by writing a dummy value “−”.
1 We use the term “user code” for all code in the system that is not part
of the micro-policy monitor, including OS-level code such as schedulers and
device drivers.

The generic symbolic rule for Store is similar:
mem[wpc ] = i@ti
decode i = Store rp rs
reg[rp ]=wp @tp
reg[rs ]=ws @ts
mem[wp ]= @td
transfer(Store, tpc , ti , tp , ts , td ) = (t0pc , t0d )
(S TORE)
mem0 = mem[wp ←ws @t0d ]
0
0
(mem, reg, wpc @tpc , extra) → (mem , reg, (wpc +1)@tpc , extra)
The symbolic machine’s step relation includes a similarly
augmented version of each of the step rules of the basic machine
(see §B for a complete listing). In addition, there is one new
step rule for handling calls to monitor services, which applies
when the pc is at a service entry point—i.e., an address for
which the get service function is defined.
get service wpc = (f, ti )
transfer(Service, tpc , ti , −, −, −) = (−, −)
f (mem, reg, wpc @tpc , extra) = (mem0 , reg0 , pc0 , extra0 )
(S VC)
(mem, reg, wpc @tpc , extra) → (mem0 , reg0 , pc0 , extra0 )
Here, get service returns the monitor service itself (the function
f ), plus a tag ti . The call to transfer checks that this service
is permitted, given the tag on the current pc. The last three
inputs to transfer are set to the dummy value “−”, and the
outputs are not used, since we only care whether the operation
is allowed or not. The Service “opcode” is a special value that
is just used for querying the transfer function about service
routines. Finally, the rule invokes f to carry out the actual
work of the service routine. The behavior of f itself is now
completely up to the micro-policy designer: it is given the
complete symbolic machine state as argument, and it returns
an entire new machine state as result. In particular, some of the
service routines for the policies described below will modify
the tags in the memory. Also, user code will typically get to the
service routine entry point by executing a Jal, and the service
routine is responsible for resetting the pc to the return address
stored in register ra by the Jal. Allowing service routines to
be arbitrary partial functions from machine states to machine
states reflects the fact that, at the concrete level, service routine
code runs with a high level of privilege.
To streamline proofs about the micro-policies in later sections, we divide the symbolic tags into four distinct sets that are
used in different parts of the symbolic machine: tags from the
set Tm are used for labeling words in memory, Tr for registers,
Tpc for the pc, and Ts for monitor services. The definition
of the transfer function must conform to these conventions;
for example, when propagating tags for Binop, the three last
arguments t1 , t2 , and td should belong to Tr and the result tag
t0d should also be in Tr . This separation allows some policy
invariants to be maintained “by typechecking,” obviating the
need to maintain them explicitly in proofs and easing the
burden of formal policy verification.
As we will see in the following sections, each micro-policy
has complete freedom to treat tags as if they are associated with
the contents of memory locations or registers (pc included)
or as if they are associated with the memory locations or
registers themselves. Both points of view are valid and useful:
micro-policies like dynamic sealing and taint tracking associate

mem[pc] = i
decode i = Store rp rs
reg[rp ]=wp
reg[rs ]=vs
mem0 =mem[wp ←vs ]
(S TORE)
(mem, reg, pc) → (mem0 , reg, pc+1)
The operations of generating keys, sealing, and unsealing
are provided by monitor service routines located at addresses
mkkey addr, seal addr, and unseal addr, all of which lie
outside of accessible memory at the symbolic and abstract
levels (at the concrete level, the code for the services will
begin at these addresses). By convention, these routines take any
arguments in general-purpose registers rarg1 and rarg2 and return
4 Sealing Micro-Policy
their result in a general-purpose register rret . The definition of
Now it’s time to build micro-policies! As a warm-up, we the step relation includes a rule for each service that applies
begin with a simple micro-policy for dynamic sealing [23], a when the pc is at the corresponding address. For example:
mkkey f ks=k reg0 =reg[rret ←k] reg[ra ]=pc0 (M K K EY)
linguistic mechanism analogous to perfect symmetric encryption. Informally, we extend the basic machine with three new (mem, reg, mkkey addr, ks) → (mem, reg0 , pc0 , k::ks)
primitives (presented as monitor services): mkkey creates a
This rule applies when the machine’s pc is mkkey addr. The
fresh sealing key; seal takes a data value (a machine word)
first premise uses mkkey f to generate a fresh key k. The
and a key and returns an opaque “sealed value” that can be
second premise updates the result register rret with k. The
stored in memory and registers but not used in any other way
third premise restores the pc from the register ra . To invoke
until it is passed (together with the same key that was used
this service, a user program performs a Jal to the address
to seal it) through the unseal service, which unwraps it and
mkkey addr, which sets ra appropriately and causes this rule
returns the original raw word.
to fire on the next step. Invoking services this way means that
We proceed in three steps. First, we define an abstract
we can run exactly the same user code on this abstract machine
sealing machine, a straightforward extension of the basic maas we do on the symbolic machine (described below) and the
chine from §2 that directly captures the “user’s view.” Second,
concrete machine (§8-§9). The rule for the unsealing service is
we show how the abstract machine can be emulated on the
similar (as is the one for the sealing service, which we omit):
symbolic machine by providing an appropriate encoding of
reg[rarg1 ] = {w}k
reg[rarg2 ] = k
abstract-machine values (words, sealed values, and keys) as
0
reg
=
reg[r
←w]
reg[ra ] = pc0
ret
symbolic atoms, together with a transfer function (written as a
(U NSEAL)
program in Gallina) and Gallina implementations of the three (mem, reg, unseal addr, ks) → (mem, reg0 , pc0 , ks)
monitor services. We prove that the symbolic sealing machine The first two premises extract the sealed value {w}k from the
refines the abstract one. Third, we build concrete machine-code first argument register and check that second argument register
realizations of the symbolic transfer function and the three contains the same key k. (If the first register doesn’t contain
monitor services, which can be executed (together with user a sealed value or the key doesn’t match the second register,
code) on a concrete processor with PUMP hardware extensions. the rule fails to fire and the machine gets stuck.) The third
We carry out the first two parts in this section and sketch the premise writes the raw value w into the result register, and the
third in §9.
last premise extracts the return address from ra .
metadata only with contents, while CFI uses tags to distinguish
the memory locations containing instructions and the sources
and targets of indirect jumps, while using the pc tag to track
execution history (the sources of indirect jumps). In fact, some
micro-policies mix the two points of view: IFC associates tags
with memory and register contents, but the pc tracks execution
history (implicit flows), while memory safety tags memory
locations with compound tags that contain a part associated
with the contents and a part associated with the location.

Abstract Sealing Machine To define an abstract machine
with built-in sealing, we replace the raw words in the registers
and memory of the basic machine with values v drawn from the
more structured set Val ::= w | k | {w}k , where w ranges over
machine words, k ranges over an infinite set AK of abstract
sealing keys, and {w}k is the sealing of payload w under key
k. To keep the example simple, we disallow nested sealing and
sealing of keys: only words can be sealed. We enrich basic
machine states with a set ks of previously allocated keys, and
we assume there is some total function mkkey f that, given a
set of keys ks, chooses a fresh key not in the set.
The rules of the basic step relation are modified to use this
richer set of values. Most instructions will only work with raw
words—e.g., attempting to compare sealed values or jump to
a key will halt the machine. Load and Store require a word as
their first argument (the target memory address) but they place
no restrictions on the value being loaded or stored; similarly
Mov copies arbitrary values between registers.

Symbolic Sealing Machine The abstract machine described
above constitutes a specification—an application programmer’s
view—of the sealing micro-policy. The next piece of the micropolicy definition is a symbolic micro-policy that implements
this abstract specification in terms of tags. Since the pc is just
a bare word in the sealing abstract machine, and there are
no restrictions on when monitor services can be called, we
can take the pc and service tag sets Tpc and Ts to be just the
singleton set {•}. Tr and Tm , on the other hand, will be used
to represent the values of the abstract machine: their elements
have the one of the forms Data, Key k, or Sealed k, where k
is a symbolic key drawn from an ordered finite set SK. Raw
words are tagged Data. Keys are represented as a dummy
payload word (say, 0) tagged Key k for some k. A word w
tagged Sealed k represents the sealing of w under key k. The
extra state type EX is just SK—i.e., the extra state is a single
monotonic counter storing the next key to be generated. The
initial extra state is the minimum key.

Outside of monitor services, all the propagation and checking
of tags is performed by the transfer function of the symbolic
machine. In our formal development, transfer functions are
written in Gallina, but for readability here we will present
examples as collections of symbolic rules of the form

Refinement We formalize the connection between the abstract and symbolic sealing machines as a backward (i.e., from
symbolic to abstract) refinement property on traces. We state
the property here in a general form so that we can instantiate
it repeatedly throughout the paper.

Definition 4.1 (Backward refinement). We say that a low-level
machine (StateL , →L ) backward refines a high-level machine
H
where the metavariables PC , CI , etc. range over symbolic (State , →H ) with respect to a simulation relation ∼ between
H
L
∗ L
expressions, including variables plus a dummy value “−” to low- and high-level states if, whenever sL
1 ∼ s1 and s1 → s2 ,
H
H
∗ H
L
H
indicate input or output fields that are ignored. For example, there is some s2 such that s1 → s2 and s2 ∼ s2 .
the fact that Store requires an unsealed word in its pointer
Following standard practice, we prove this general multi-step
register (OP 1 ) and copies the tag of the source register (OP 2 )
refinement property by establishing a correspondence between
to the result is captured by the following symbolic rule:
individual execution steps. In the case of sealing, we prove a
strong 1-backward simulation theorem showing that each step
Store : (•, Data, Data, tsrc , −) → (•, tsrc )
of the symbolic machine is simulated by exactly one step of
Similarly, the Jal rule ensures that the target register (OP 1 ) is the abstract one.
tagged Data:
Definition 4.2 (1-backward simulation). If sL ∼ sH and sL →
opcode : (PC , CI , OP1 , OP2 , OP3 ) → (PC 0 , R 0 )

1

Jal : (•, Data, Data, −, −) → (•, Data)
(The symbolic machine step rule for Jal is in §B.)
As we described in §3, the symbolic machine handles all
monitor services with a single rule that uses a function get service (provided as part of the micro-policy definition) to do the
actual work; given a memory address, get service returns either
nothing or a pair of a Gallina function defining the service’s
behavior and a symbolic tag that is passed to the transfer function so that it can check whether the call to this service is legal
from this machine state. For the sealing micro-policy, we define
get service to map mkkey addr to (mkkey, •), seal addr to
(seal, •), and unseal addr to (unseal, •), where mkkey and
unseal (seal is similar) are defined by:
reg[ra ] = wpc0 @
reg0 = reg[rret ←0@(Key nk)]
nk 6= max key
nk0 = nk + 1
mkkey (mem, reg, pc, nk) 7→ (mem, reg0 , wpc0 @•, nk0 )
reg[rarg1 ] = w@(Sealed k)
reg[rarg2 ] = w0 @(Key k)
0
reg[ra ] = wpc0 @
reg = reg[rret ←w@Data]
unseal (mem, reg, pc, nk) 7→ (mem, reg0 , wpc0 @•, nk)
The constant max key stands for the largest representable key,
and 0 is used as a dummy payload for fresh keys.
Note that mkkey is a partial function: it can fail if all keys
have been used up. This models the fact that, on the concrete
machine, keys will be implemented as fixed-width machine
words. By contrast, the abstract sealing machine uses an infinite
set of keys, so it will never fail for this reason. This discrepancy
is not an issue for the backward refinement property, which
only requires us to show that if the symbolic machine takes
a step then a corresponding step can be taken by the abstract
machine. (Forward refinement, on the other hand, does not hold:
the symbolic machine will fail to simulate the abstract one
when it runs out of fresh keys. Giving up forward refinement is
the price we pay for choosing not to expose low-level resource
constraints at the abstract level.)

1

1

H
H
H
L
H
sL
2 then there exists s2 such that s1 → s2 and s2 ∼ s2 .

For sealing, since keys are dynamically allocated, our simulation relation is parameterized by a partial map ψ relating
abstract and symbolic keys. We begin by defining an auxiliary
relation ∼SA
ψ showing how abstract atoms relate to symbolic
ones (SA stands for Symbolic-to-Abstract):
0
w@Data ∼SA
when w = w0
ψ w
S
SA
A
w@(Key k ) ∼ψ k
when ψ[k A ] = k S
0
0
A
S
w@(Sealed k S ) ∼SA
ψ {w }kA when w = w ∧ ψ[k ] = k .

The relation ∼SA
ψ does not hold otherwise. Then, we define
the simulation relation on states, also noted ∼SA
ψ , by lifting the
previous relation “pointwise” to all atoms, and adding these
invariants: (a) all abstract keys in the domain of ψ are in the
set of currently allocated keys in the abstract state; (b) all
symbolic keys in the range of ψ are strictly smaller than the
current value of the monotonic counter; and (c) ψ is injective.
We then get the following result:
Theorem 4.3 (1-backward SA-simulation for sealing). The
symbolic machine instantiated with the sealing micro-policy
1-backward-simulates the sealing abstract machine with respect
A
to the simulation relation λsS sA . ∃ψ. sS ∼SA
ψ s .
Notice that, in the above statement, the key map parameter ψ
is existentially quantified and not fixed, since it must be updated
on each call to mkkey to maintain the correspondence between
the newly generated keys, which are drawn from different sets
at the two levels. This setup allows us to elide irrelevant details
of key allocation from the abstract machine. This is only a
minor convenience for sealing, but the idiom becomes quite
important in other micro-policies for hiding complex objects
like memory allocators (§7) from the high-level specification.

5

Compartmentalization Micro-Policy

We next describe a micro-policy for enforcing isolation between program-defined “compartments,” dynamically demar-

cated memory regions that, by default, cannot jump or write
to each other. This model is based on Wahbe et al.’s work
on software fault isolation (SFI) [32], with a few differences
discussed below. To demonstrate isolation, we show that a
symbolic-machine instance refines an abstract machine that
enforces compartmentalization by construction.
Abstract Machine The abstract machine for this micro-policy
enforces compartmentalization directly by maintaining, alongside the usual machine state, a set C of current compartments
that is consulted on each step to prevent one compartment
from improperly transferring execution to or writing to another. Each abstract compartment in C is a triple (A, J, S)
containing (1) an address space A of addresses that belong
to the compartment, i.e., where its instructions and data are
stored; (2) a set of jump targets J, additional addresses that
it is allowed to jump to; and (3) a set of store targets S,
additional addresses that it is allowed to write to. Compartments
are not limited to contiguous regions of memory. Also, as
in Wahbe et al.’s model [32], reading from memory is not
constrained: code in one compartment is permitted to read from
addresses in any other. (Adding a set of “read targets” to each
abstract compartment would be a straightforward extension.)
The machine maintains a number of invariants, of which the
most important is that all compartments have disjoint address
spaces.
The abstract machine state includes a flag F ∈ {Jumped,
FallThrough} that records whether or not the previous instruction was a Jump or a Jal, together with the previously executing
compartment, prev = (Aprev , Jprev , Sprev ). This information is
used to prevent illegal pc changes (on both jumps and ordinary
steps) and to allow monitor services to see which compartment
called them.
At the abstract level, all instructions behave as in the basic
machine (§2), with the addition of a compartmentalization
check. For example, here is the rule for Store:
mem[pc] = i
decode i = Store rp rs
reg[rp ] = wp
reg[rs ] = ws
mem0 = mem[wp ←ws ]
(A, J, S) ∈ C
pc ∈ A
wp ∈ A ∪ S
(A, J, S) = (Aprev , Jprev , Sprev ) ∨ (F = Jumped ∧ pc ∈ Jprev )
(mem, reg, pc, C, F, (Aprev , Jprev , Sprev ))
(S TORE)
→ (mem0 , reg, pc + 1, C, FallThrough, (A, J, S))
Most of the new features here are common to the step rules
for all the instructions: each rule checks that the current instruction is executing inside some compartment ((A, J, S) ∈ C
and pc ∈ A) and (using prev) that execution arrived at this
instruction either (a) from the same compartment, or (b) with
F = Jumped and the current pc in the previous compartment’s
set of jump targets (the final line of the precondition). In the
new machine state, we update the previous compartment to
be the compartment the pc currently lies in. And we set F
to FallThrough (the rules for Jump and Jal set it to Jumped).
Besides these generic conditions, the Store rule has an additional check that its write is either to the current compartment
or to one of its store targets (wp ∈ A ∪ S).

Deferring detection of illegal pc changes until one step after
they have occurred is the key trick that makes this tag-based
implementation at the symbolic level work; we will use a
similar approach for CFI in §6.
The compartmentalization abstract machine also provides
three monitor services. The core service is isolate, which
creates a new compartment. It takes as input the description of a
fresh compartment (A0 , J 0 , S 0 ) and adds it to C, also removing
the addresses in A0 from the address space of the parent
compartment. Before allowing the operation, the service checks,
relative to the parent compartment (A, J, S), that A0 ⊆ A, that
J 0 ⊆ A ∪ J, and that S 0 ⊆ A ∪ S. This ensures that the
new compartment is no more privileged than its parent. The
argument sets are passed to the service as pointers to in-memory
data structures representing sets of addresses.
The other two services modify the target sets of the current compartment. If the current compartment is (A, J, S),
add jump target takes as input an address a ∈ A and modifies
the current compartment to (A, J ∪ {a}, S); add store target
does the same thing for store targets. Note that although isolate
removes the child’s address space from the parent, it leaves the
store and jump targets of the parent unchanged, and these can
overlap with the child’s address space. Thus, the parent can
preserve access to an address in its child’s memory by calling
add jump target or add store target with that address before
invoking isolate.
In the initial configuration of the abstract machine, all defined
addresses lie in one big compartment and each monitor service
address has its own unique compartment (i.e., these locations
are special and live outside of addressable memory). The main
compartment has the addresses of the monitor services in its
set of jump targets, allowing it to call them; the monitor service
compartments have all defined addresses in their set of jump
targets, allowing them to return to any address. Since, in order
to call a monitor service, its address must lie in the calling
compartment’s set of jump targets, a parent compartment can
choose to prevent a child it creates from calling specific services
by restricting the child’s jump table.
Before returning, each monitor service checks that the compartment it is returning to is the same as the one it was called
from. This detail is needed to prevent malicious use of monitor
services to change compartments: otherwise, calling a service
from the last address of a compartment would cause execution
to proceed from the first address of a subsequent compartment,
even if the original compartment was not allowed to jump
there.
As a sanity check on the abstract machine, we prove that
it satisfies a compartmentalization property based on the informal presentation by Wahbe et al. [32]. We first prove that
the machine maintains invariants ensuring that each defined
memory location lies in exactly one compartment. We use this
to prove that, on every step, (a) if the machine isn’t stuck, then
the new pc is either in the initial pc’s compartment or in its
set of jump targets; and (b) if a memory location was changed,
then its address was either in the initial pc’s compartment or
in its set of store targets.

Symbolic Machine Our method for implementing this ab- given address; if the previous tag was hc, I, W i and the current
stract machine in terms of tags involves “dualizing” the rep- compartment is c0 , then the new tag will be hc, I ∪ {c0 }, W i.
resentation of compartments: rather than maintaining global The add store target service is analogous. The isolate service
state recording which compartments exist and what memory does four things: (1) It gets a fresh compartment id cnew (from
locations they are allowed to affect, we instead tag memory the counter, which it then increments). (2) It retags every
locations to record which compartments are allowed to affect location in the new compartment’s address space, changing its
them. Compartments are represented by unique ids, and the tag from hc, I, W i into hcnew , I, W i. (3) It retags every location
extra state of the symbolic machine contains a monotonic in the new compartment’s set of jump targets, changing its
counter next for the next available compartment id.
tag from hcJ , IJ , WJ i into hcJ , IJ ∪ {cnew }, WJ i. (4) It retags
For this policy, Tm contains triples hc, I, W i, where c is the new compartment’s set of store targets, changing each tag
the id of the compartment to which a tagged memory location from hcS , IS , WS i into hcS , IS , WS ∪ {cnew }i.
belongs, I is the set of incoming compartment ids identifying
which other compartments are allowed to jump to this location, Refinement To prove that the symbolic compartmentalization
and W is the set of writer ids identifying which other com- machine is correct, we prove backward simulation with respect
partments are allowed to write to this location. Tpc contains to the abstract compartmentalization machine:
pairs hF, ci, where the flag F has the same role as on the
Theorem 5.1 (1-backward SA-simulation). The symbolic comabstract machine and c is the id of the compartment from
partmentalization machine backward-simulates the abstract
which the previous instruction was executed. Since registers do
compartmentalization machine.
not play a role in this micro-policy, Tr contains just the dummy
value •. The extra state contains three tags, tI , tAJ , and tAS ,
The bulk of the work in this proof lies in showing that
corresponding to the tags on the monitor services’ entry points when we pass from a global set of compartment information
in the abstract machine. We cannot use the symbolic machine’s to our “dualized” tag-based approach, that we indeed retain
monitor service tags, as those are immutable; the compartmen- the same information: we must prove that the compartment
talization policy thus maintain its mutable monitor service tags IDs are assigned consistently and that the jump targets/store
in the extra state. (This limitation is not fundamental, but does targets correspond to the incoming/writers. In other words, our
not impact any other micro-policies.)
symbolic tags must “refine” our abstract compartments. This
Here are a few of the symbolic rules (the rest are similar):
difficulty shows up for the monitor services in particular: since
the effects of the monitor services are specified in terms of the
c = c0 ∨ (F = Jumped ∧ c ∈ I)
0
0
abstract representation (e.g., add jump target must add a jump
Nop : (hF, ci, hc , I, W i, −, −, −) → (hFallThrough, c i, −)
target, but there is no such thing at the symbolic level), the proof
c = c0 ∨ (F = Jumped ∧ c ∈ I)
that the effects of the symbolic implementations on the tags do
Jump : (hF, ci, hc0 , I, W i, •, −, −) → (hJumped, c0 i, −)
in fact correspond to the more direct abstract implementations
0
0
00
0
0
is particularly complicated. For the single-instruction steps of
c = c ∨ (F = Jumped ∧ c ∈ I)
c =c ∨c ∈W
the symbolic machine, we are able to capture most of the tagStore : (hF, ci, hc0 , I, W i, •, •, hc00 , I 0 , W 0 i)
based complexity in a single lemma proving that the standard
→ (hFallThrough, c0 i, hc00 , I 0 , W 0 i)
symbolic check (c = c0 ∨ (F = Jumped ∧ c ∈ I)), along with
The first side-condition on all the rules guarantees that all pc well-formedness and refinement constraints, suffices to prove
changes are legal: c, taken from the pc tag, is the previously- that the standard abstract checks ((A, J, S) ∈ C, pc ∈ A, and
executing compartment; and c0 , from the tag on the current (A, J, S) = (Aprev , Jprev , Sprev ) ∨ (F = Jumped ∧ pc ∈ Jprev ))
instruction, is the current compartment. An execution step hold for the corresponding compartment.
is allowed if it is in the same compartment (c = c0 ), or if
it follows a jump from a permitted incoming compartment Related Work Fine-grained compartmentalization is usually
(F = Jumped ∧ c ∈ I). Similarly, the extra side-condition for achieved by software fault isolation [33]. There are several
Store checks that the write is to a location in the currently- verified SFI systems, including ARMor [35], RockSalt [24], and
executing compartment (c0 = c00 ) or to a location that accepts a portable one by Kroll et al. [18]. Our compartmentalization
model is based on Wahbe et al.’s original SFI work [32] but
the current compartment as a writer (c0 ∈ W 0 ).
From the rules, we can see that this encoding breaks up differs from it in several ways. Most importantly, our monitor
the jump targets of each compartment, scattering the jumping is not based on binary rewriting, but instead uses the hardware/
compartment’s id into the destination component in the tag software mechanism of the PUMP architecture. Our model
on each individual jump target; the store target are similarly is also richer in that it provides a hierarchical compartmentscattered across the writers component. The state maintained creation mechanism instead of a single trusted top-level proin the pc tag corresponds exactly to the extra state maintained gram that can spawn one level of untrusted plugins. While
by the abstract machine (i.e., F and prev), except that we use Wahbe et al.’s model produces safe (intra-compartment) but
arbitrary effects on compartmentalization violations, we detect
a compartment id rather than an abstract compartment.
The monitor services must also be rephrased in terms of tags. such violations and halt the machine. One feature Wahbe et al.’s
The add jump target service simply modifies the tag on the model that we do not currently support is inter-compartment

RPCs; we instead require programs to manually predeclare
inter-compartment calls and returns.

rule for Store illustrates both these points:
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It requires the fetched Store instruction to be tagged Code and
the written location to be tagged Data. On the other hand, the
Jal instruction’s rule requires that the current instruction be
tagged Code src; it then copies Code src to the pc tag:

Control-Flow Integrity Micro-Policy

Store : (Code ⊥, Code

, −, −, Data) → (Code ⊥, Data)

We next outline a micro-policy enforcing fine-grained controlflow integrity (CFI) [1] as well as providing basic non-writable
code (NWC) and non-executable data (NXD) protection. It
Jal : (Code ⊥, Code src, −, −, −) → (Code src, −)
dynamically enforces that all indirect control flows (computed
jumps) adhere to a fixed control flow graph (CFG). (This CFG Only on the next instruction do we get enough information
might, for example, be obtained from a compiler.) This prevents from the tags to check that the destination of the jump is
control-flow-hijacking attacks, in which an attacker exploits a indeed allowed by J. For this we add a second rule for each
low-level vulnerability to gain full control of a target program. instruction, dealing with the case where it is the target of a
A more detailed description of this micropolicy is in §A.
jump and thus the pc tag is Code src, e.g.:
Our main result is a proof that a variant of the CFI property
(src, dst) ∈ J
of Abadi et al. [1] holds for the symbolic machine when
Store : (Code src, Code dst, −, −, Data) → (Code ⊥, Data)
instantiated with our CFI micro-policy. For this, we first prove
that the CFI property is preserved by backward simulation. We add such rules even for jump instructions, since the target
We then use this preservation result to show that the symbolic of a computed jump can itself be another computed jump:
CFI machine has CFI, by proving that it simulates an abstract
(src, dst-src) ∈ J
machine that has CFI by construction. The CFI definition relies
on a formal overapproximation of the attacker’s capabilities, Jal : (Code src, Code dst-src, −, −, −) → (Code dst-src, −)
allowing the attacker to change any data in the system except Proof Organization Our proofs are structured around a gefor the code, the pc, and the tags (if the machine has them). neric CFI preservation result that states that CFI is preserved
This models an attacker that can mount buffer-overflow attacks by backward simulation under some additional assumptions
but cannot subvert the monitor; this is a reasonable assumption (§A). As mentioned, we use this to transport the CFI property
since we assume that any implementation of the monitor will from the abstract machine to the symbolic machine.
be able to protect its integrity. For the same reason we assume
This approach allows us to structure our proofs in a modular
that in monitor mode all control flows are allowed. Since way. More importantly, the reusable nature of the preservation
we assume that monitor code is correct, we do not need to theorem provides an easy way to transfer the CFI property
dynamically enforce CFI there.
from the symbolic machine to a concrete machine that correctly
implements the CFI micro-policy while keeping most of the
Abstract CFI Machine The abstract machine has separate reasoning about the properties of the micro-policy at a higher
instruction and data memories; the instruction memory is fixed level. We were able to do this and transport the CFI property
(NWC), and instructions are fetched only from this memory to the instance of the concrete machine presented in §8; details
(NXD). Indirect jumps are checked against an allowed set J of are presented in §A.
source-target pairs; if the control flow is invalid the machine
Finally, we prove that the symbolic machine backwardstops. The attacker can make arbitrary changes to the data simulates the correct-by-construction abstract machine, which—
memory and registers at any time.
in combination with our CFI preservation result—proves the
correctness of the micro-policy.
Symbolic CFI Machine At the symbolic level, code and data
are stored in the same memory, and we use tags to distinguish Related Work Abadi et al. [1] proposed both the first CFI
between the two. Tags on memory are drawn from the set definition and a reasonably efficient, though coarse-grained,
Data | Code addr | Code ⊥ and for the pc from Code addr | enforcement mechanism based on binary analysis and rewriting,
Code ⊥ (other registers are always tagged •). For the CFG in which each node in the CFG is assigned to one of three
conformance checks, instructions that are the source or target equivalence classes. This seminal work was extended in various
of indirect control flows are tagged with Code addr, where directions, often trading off precision for low overheads and
addr is the address of the instruction in memory. For example, practicality [34]. However, recent attacks against coarse-grained
a Jump instruction stored at address 500 is tagged Code 500. CFI [10], [14] have illustrated the security risks of imprecision.
The CFI policy does not need to keep track of where other This has spurred interest in fine-grained CFI [8], [22], [28],
instructions are located, so they are all tagged Code ⊥. (This sometimes called complete or ideal CFI; however, this has been
keeps the number of distinct tags small, which would reduce deemed “very expensive” [14]. Several proposed hardware
cache pressure when executing this micro-policy on the concrete mechanisms are directly targeted at speeding up CFI [5], [9];
machine described in §8.) Only memory locations tagged Data here we achieve CFI using a generic hardware mechanism
can be modified (NWC), and only instructions fetched from in a formally verified way. The PUMP mechanism supports
locations tagged Code can be executed (NXD). The symbolic fine-grained CFI with modest runtime overhead [11]. Previous

formal verification efforts for CFI include ARMor [35] and ⊥. Allocated memory locations are tagged with a pair (c, tv ),
KCoFI [8]. Like most work on CFI, they use inline reference where c is the color of the encompassing block and tv is the
monitoring [13]; their verification targets a small-TCB compo- tag of the stored value. Unallocated memory is tagged with
nent which validates that the right checks were inserted in the the special tag F (free). We use tm to range over memory tags.
instrumented binary.
The extra state for this policy is a list of block descriptors
recording which memory regions have been allocated (with the
7 Memory Safety Micro-Policy
corresponding base and bounds) and which colors correspond
Last, we describe a micro-policy that enforces safe access to to them, plus a counter for generating new colors.
The malloc monitor service first searches the list of block
heap-allocated data, by preventing both spatial safety violations
descriptors
for a free block of at least the required size, cuts
(e.g., accessing an array out of its bounds) and temporal
off
the
excess
if needed, generates a fresh color c, initializes
safety violations (e.g., referencing through a pointer after the
the
new
memory
block with 0@(c, ⊥), and returns the atom
region has been freed). Such violations are a common source
w@c,
where
w
is
the start address of the block.
of serious security vulnerabilities such as heap-based buffer
The
free
monitor
service reads the pointer color, deallocates
overflows, confidential data leaks, and exploitable use-afterthe
corresponding
block,
tags its cells with F, and updates the
free, and double-free bugs. The policy we study here only
block
descriptors.
The
F
tags prevent any remaining pointers
guards heap-allocated data, for which calls to the malloc and
to
the
deallocated
block
from being used to access it after
free monitor services tell us how to set up and tear down
deallocation.
If
a
later
allocation
reuses the same memory, it
memory regions; we leave stack allocation and C-like unboxed
will
be
tagged
with
a
different
(larger)
color, so these dangling
structs as future work.
pointers will still be unusable.
Abstract Machine The abstract machine presents a blockThe symbolic rules for Load and Store check that the pointer
based memory model to the programmer [4], [20]: it operates
and the referenced location have the same color c.
on values that are either ordinary machine words w or pointers
p. A pointer is a pair (b, o) of a block identifier b (drawn from
Load : (cpc , (cpc , ⊥), c, (c, tv ), −) → (cpc , tv )
an infinite set) and an offset o (a machine word). The memory
Store : (cpc , (cpc , ⊥), c, tv , (c, t0v )) → (cpc , (c, tv ))
is a partial function from block identifiers to lists of values; its
domain is the set of allocated blocks. Load and Store require We additionally require that the pc tag cpc matches the color
pointer values (b, o). They first look up the block id b in the of the block to which the pc points. This ensures that the pc
memory; if this block is currently allocated, they obtain a list cannot be used to leak information about inaccessible frames
of values vs, which they read or update at index o (provided o by loading instructions from them. On Jumps we change the
is in bounds).
color of the pc to the color c of the pointer, while for Jal we
also use cpc to tag the ra register:
mem[bpc ] = vspc
vspc [opc ] = i
decode i=Store rp rs
reg[rp ]=(b, o)
reg[rs ]=v
mem[b]=vs
vs0 =vs[o←v]
mem0 =mem[b←vs0 ]
0
(mem, reg, (bpc , opc )) → (mem , reg, (bpc , opc +1)) (S TORE)

Jump : (cpc , (cpc , ⊥), c, −, −) → (c, −)
Jal

: (cpc , (cpc , ⊥), tv , −, −) → (tv , cpc ).

The pc itself contains a pointer with a block and an offset; We also allow Jals to words tagged ⊥, since monitor services
instruction fetching works the same as normal memory loads. lie outside the accessible memory at this level of abstraction
As with sealing key generation (§4), the allocation and and so cannot be referenced by normal pointers.
Binary operations are allowed between values tagged ⊥
freeing monitor services are parameterized by two functions,
(non-pointers),
and they produce values tagged ⊥:
alloc f and free f, that are assumed to satisfy certain highlevel properties: alloc f takes a memory and a size, and returns
Binop⊕ : (cpc , (cpc , ⊥), ⊥, ⊥, −) → (cpc , ⊥)
a block that was not already allocated and a new memory in
which this block is mapped to a frame; free f takes a memory We also allow adding and subtracting integers from pointers:
and an allocated block and returns a new memory where the
Binop+,− : (cpc , (cpc , ⊥), c, ⊥, −) → (cpc , c)
block is no longer allocated, keeping all other blocks the same.
Binop+ : (cpc , (cpc , ⊥), ⊥, c, −) → (cpc , c)
Symbolic Machine In the symbolic part of the memorysafety micro-policy, we replace the block-structured memory The result of such pointer arithmetic is a pointer with the
of the abstract machine by a flat memory where each cell is same color c. The new pointer is not necessarily in bounds,
tagged with a color representing the block to which it belongs. but the rules for Load and Store will prevent invalid accesses.
Pointers are also tagged with colors, and when a pointer is (Computing an out-of-bounds pointer is not a violation per
dereferenced we check that its color matches the color of the se—indeed, it happens quite often in practice, e.g., at the end
memory cell it points to.
of loops.) Moreover, subtraction can compute the integer offset
More precisely, we use different sets of tags for values between two pointers to the same block:
in registers (and the pc) and in memory. Value tags tv are
Binop−,= : (cpc , (cpc , ⊥), c, c, −) → (cpc , ⊥)
either pointers tagged with a color c or non-pointers tagged

Pointers to the same block can also be compared for equality
using Binop= . But comparing a pointer and a non-pointer or
comparing two pointers to different blocks must be disallowed
(because two out-of-bounds pointers to different blocks can be
numerically equal at the symbolic level, whereas they cannot
be equal at the abstract level). While the transfer function can
detect this situation, it cannot alter the results of instructions;
thus, we can only preserve refinement by having the transfer
function stop execution. Intuitively, all instructions on pointers
must be expressible at the abstract level independent of base
addresses. (Subtraction works as presented because equal base
addresses cancel out, even in the presence of overflows.)
Monitor services do not have this restriction, though, so we
can—if one is required—provide a total equality service that
returns false in those cases where the equality instruction would
be disallowed.
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Concrete Machine

Having explored four examples of how the symbolic machine
can be instantiated to enforce a variety of micro-policies, we
turn to the question of how its behavior can be realized on a
concrete machine that incorporates PUMP-like hardware [11] in
idealized form. The concrete machine differs from the symbolic
one in several key ways. (1) Its memory, registers, and pc hold
concrete atoms of the form w@t, where the concrete tag t is
simply a machine word (possibly interpreted as a pointer into
memory). (2) It propagates and checks tags using a cache of
concrete rules, each encoding a single tuple from the graph
of the (concrete) transfer function. (3) The cache initially
contains a finite set of ground rules; it is further populated
as needed by a software miss handler, which embodies the
transfer function. (4) Extra machine state is represented by
ordinary in-memory data structures. (5) Each monitor service
is implemented as an (almost) ordinary software subroutine,
whose
starting address coincides with the service’s entry point
Refinement We prove a backward-simulation theorem similar
at
the
abstract
and symbolic levels. An instance of the symbolic
to the one for sealing (§4):
machine for a specific micro-policy is realized on the concrete
Theorem 7.1 (1-backward SA-simulation). The symbolic mem- machine by defining a concrete encoding for tags and any extra
ory safety machine backward-simulates the abstract machine. state, providing a miss handler that implements the symbolic
transfer function, and providing implementations of any monitor
The main technical difficulty lies in formalizing the correspon- services. In §9, we describe a generic approach to constructing
dence between memory addresses at the symbolic and abstract and verifying such realizations. In the remainder of this section,
levels, and showing that this correspondence is preserved we formalize the concrete machine itself as an extension of the
throughout execution. Specifically, each color c used at the basic machine (§2). A practical PUMP implementation [11]
symbolic machine should map to a block identifier b at the would add similar extensions to a real-world RISC ISA. The
abstract level, in such a way that the memory region tagged details in this section are not needed to follow §9 and can be
with c matches the block pointed to by b; we consider that an skimmed if desired.
address x marked with color c should correspond to memory
The concrete machine adds four new instructions for monitor
location (b, x − xbase ) at the abstract level, where xbase is the code:
base address of the corresponding region. Additionally, we
must maintain the invariant that symbolic block descriptors
AddRule | JumpFpc | GetTag rs rd | PutTag rs rtag rd
faithfully describe how memory regions are tagged.
AddRule, described in detail below, inserts a new rule into the
Showing that memory operations and monitor services (in
cache. JumpFpc is used to return from the miss handler: it
particular, the allocator) preserve the refinement relation injumps to the address in the fpc (“fault pc”), a new specialvolves explicitly manipulating the address mappings described
purpose register that holds the address of the faulting instruction
above and a fair amount of low-level reasoning about address
after a cache miss. GetTag r1 r2 takes the tag t from the atom
segments and arithmetic, which consumes almost half of the
w@t stored in r1 and returns it as the payload part of a new
complete proof.
atom t@Monitor in r2 , where Monitor is a fixed concrete tag
used by monitor code. PutTag r1 r2 r3 does the converse: if
Related Work Our scheme is inspired by the metadata taint- r1 and r2 contain w1 @t1 and w2 @t2 , it stores w1 @w2 into r3 .
ing technique of Clause et al. [7]. Similar ideas have been The monitor self-protection mechanism described in §9 ensures
used by Watchdog [25] (for temporal safety), though these that these instructions can only be executed by monitor code.
systems do not have formal proofs. Nagarakatte et al. have
Concrete states have the form (mem, reg, pc, fpc, cache), where
verified in Coq that the SoftBound pass in LLVM/Vellvm cache is a set of concrete rules, each of the form (iv, ov).
satisfies “spatial safety” [27] and that the CETS temporal safety The input vector iv represents the key for rule cache lookups
extension to SoftBound is correct in the sense of backward and contains the instruction opcode, the tag of the current
simulation[26]. These proofs are with respect to correct-by- instruction, the tag of the pc, and up to three operand tags. The
construction special-purpose machines. Abadi and Plotkin [2] output vector ov provides the tags of the new pc and of the
show that address space layout randomization can be used to result. On each step, the machine constructs iv from the current
prevent low-level attacks, including memory safety violations, instruction opcode and the relevant tags and looks it up in the
by proving a probabilistic variant of full abstraction with respect cache. If a matching rule is found (written cache ` iv 7→ ov),
to a high-level language semantics.
the instruction is allowed and the next state is tagged according

to ov. If no rule matches (cache ` iv ↑), then iv is saved in
memory, the current pc value is saved in the fpc, and control is
transferred to a fixed address where the miss handler should be
loaded (trapaddr). Accordingly, each rule in the step relation
comes in two variants—one for when we hit in the cache and
one for when we trap to the miss handler. For example, here
are the rules for Store:
mem[wpc ] = i@ti
decode i = Store rp rs
reg[rp ]=wp @tp
reg[rs ]=ws @ts
mem[wp ]= @td
cache ` (Store, tpc , ti , tp , ts , td ) 7→ (t0pc , t0d )
mem0 = mem[wp ←ws @t0d ]
(mem, reg, wpc @tpc , fpc, cache)
(S TORE)
→ (mem0 , reg, (wpc +1)@t0pc , fpc, cache)
mem[wpc ] = i@ti
decode i = Store rp rs
reg[rp ]=wp @tp
reg[rs ]=ws @ts
mem[wp ]= @td
cache ` (Store, tpc , ti , tp , ts , td ) ↑
mem0 = mem[0..5 ← (Store, tpc , ti , tp , ts , td )]
(mem, reg, wpc @tpc , fpc, cache)
(S TORE -M ISS)
→ (mem0 , reg, trapaddr@Monitor, wpc @tpc , cache)
Addresses 0 to 5 are used, by convention, to store the current iv
for use by the miss handler in the final premise of the second
rule. The miss handler computes the result tags, stores them at
addresses 6 and 7, and uses the AddRule instruction to insert
the new rule into the cache.
mem[wpc ] = i@ti
decode i = AddRule
cache ` (AddRule, tpc , ti , −, −, −) 7→ (t0pc , −)
mem[0..7] = (opcode, t1 , t2 , t3 , t4 , t5 , t6 , t7 )
cache0 = cache ] ((opcode, t1 , t2 , t3 , t4 , t5 ) 7→ (t6 , t7 ))
(mem, reg, wpc @tpc , fpc, cache)
(A DD RULE)
→ (mem, reg0 , (wpc +1)@t0pc , fpc, cache0 )
Here ] is map update, overwriting any previous value for
(opcode, t1 , t2 , t3 , t4 , t5 ). For simplicity, we assume that the
cache’s size is unlimited, avoiding the need to model eviction;
limiting the cache size would require more complicated code
for handling cache misses, of course, but would not change
the specification of handler correctness (see §9).
A final detail is that the machine can be configured on a peropcode basis to mask out (i.e., set to a predefined “don’t care”
tag) selected fields of the iv before matching against the cache.
This is easy to implement in hardware, and it permits a single
cache entry to match many different iv tuples. The machine
can also be configured on a per-opcode basis to “copy through”
a specified iv tag to either of the ov tag fields. These features
allow more compact representation of transfer functions as
concrete rules. The machine uses a special pair of don’t-care
and copy-through masks when running monitor code (i.e., when
the pc tag is Monitor); we use this to ensure that the set of
ground rules is finite (see §9) and that the monitor does not
fault when it comes in contact with user tags (for instance
when returning back to user mode).
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Concrete Micro-Policy Monitor

The last piece of our story is the realization of symbolic micropolicies on the concrete machine. Although symbolic micro-

policies vary widely in details, concrete micro-policy implementations share several important characteristics: (1) concrete
tags (and extra state) must faithfully encode symbolic tags
(and extra state); (2) the concrete miss handler and monitor
services code must implement the symbolic machine’s Coq
specifications; (3) control transfers between user and monitor
code must obey a clear protocol; and (4) tags and monitor code
and data must be protected from malicious or compromised user
code. To take advantage of these commonalities, we have built
a generic framework for organizing the construction of concrete
micro-policies and proved a theorem stating that they refine
a corresponding symbolic machine instance. Since symbolic
micro-policies can be specified using the full power of Gallina,
the details of concrete tag and extra state representation plus
the actual code for the miss handler and monitor services must
all be provided by the micro-policy designer. This code might
be handwritten or generated from a high-level language by a
compiler; the details are unimportant. The proof of correctness
of the generic framework is parameterized on correctness proofs
for these policy-specific components.2
Tag Representation A micro-policy has four sets of symbolic tags (Tm , Tr , Tpc and Ts ) that must be represented as
word-sized bit vectors on the concrete machine. Concrete tags
on the register file and the pc will be used to represent symbolic
ones drawn from the corresponding sets—namely, Tr and Tpc .
Since monitor services are implemented by code that lives in
memory, a tag in memory will either represent something in
Tm (in which case it marks a memory location that is visible
at the symbolic level), or something in Ts (in which case it
marks the address of a monitor service).
Formally, this representation scheme is specified by partial decoding functions deck (memC , tC ) that take a concrete
machine memory and concrete machine tag word as inputs,
and produce symbolic tags as output.3 Here, k ∈ {M, R, P}
specifies which kind of concrete tag—memory, register or pc—
we are decoding, so that we know what kind of symbolic
tag to produce. Hence, decM (memC , tC ) ∈ {User tS | tS ∈
Tm } ] {Entry tS | tS ∈ Ts }, while decR (memC , tC ) ∈ Tr and
decP (memC , tC ) ∈ Tpc . We say that a concrete tag is a valid
user-level tag (given some memory) when it can be decoded
into a symbolic tag. For simplicity, from here on we will refer
to such tags by their symbolic decodings. We require that
deck (memC , Monitor) be undefined—i.e., that no symbolic tag
be represented by it.
Monitor Self-Protection At the symbolic level, it is impossible for user code to interfere with the internal state of the
2 To manage the size of our verification effort and focus attention on the
more novel parts, we assume the existence of correct monitor implementations
as hypotheses. We expect the actual implementations to be straightforward,
and verification of this kind of low-level code is a well-studied area [4], [6],
[17].
3 For simple micro-policies, symbolic tags can be accurately represented
in a single machine word, so dec does not depend on the memory argument.
More complex micro-policies may use the memory argument to represent tags
as data structures in memory—e.g., the compartmentalization micro-policy
of §5 uses this feature.

micro-policy. At the concrete level, however (unlike in some of
our own previous work [4], [11]), monitor code and data live in
ordinary memory and registers, which user code must somehow
be prevented from accessing. Moreover, we need to ensure
that only monitor code can execute the special instructions
AddRule, PutTag, GetTag, and JumpFpc. Fortunately, we can
use the PUMP itself both to implement the symbolic micropolicy and, at the same time, to enforce the restrictions above
(which we call monitor self-protection). To achieve this, we
use the special Monitor tag to mark all of the monitor’s code
and data, allowing the miss handler to detect when untrusted
code is trying to tamper with it, as explained below.

call AddRule to install it, and restart the instruction that trapped
by jumping through the fpc register.
Besides correctly implementing its symbolic counterpart, the
concrete transfer function is also responsible for setting the
next pc to Monitor whenever a valid monitor-service call is
made (i.e., when the instruction tag is Entry tS ). This ensures
that monitor services can execute with the appropriate privilege.
Refinement We formalize the relation between the symbolic
machine (instantiated with the symbolic parts of some micropolicy) and the concrete machine (instantiated with the concrete
parts of the same micro-policy) as a backward refinement
between their step relations.4 The proof of backward refinement
relies on some lemmas relating the symbolic and concrete parts
of the specific policy; the proofs of these must also be supplied
by the micro-policy designer.
At the heart of our refinement result lies the following strong
simulation relation, which describes how a symbolic machine
state is represented at the concrete level.

Monitor Code and Ground Rules On the concrete machine,
every instruction causes a rule cache lookup, which results in a
fault if no corresponding rule is present. Since the machine has
no special “privileged mode,” this applies even to monitor code.
To ensure that monitor code can do its job, we set up cache
ground rules (one for each opcode) saying that the machine can
step whenever the PC and CI tags in the iv are tagged Monitor; Definition 9.1. Strong simulation ≈CS is defined as follows (its
in this case, the next pc and any result of the instruction are also pieces are discussed below):
tagged Monitor. Monitor code must never change or override
regC ∼memC regS
memC ∼ memS
these rules.
cache ok(memC , cache)
services ok(memC )
In addition, the fact that the machine uses a special pair of
memC [0..7] = [ @Monitor, . . . , @Monitor]
don’t-care and copy-through masks when running monitor code
I(memC , regC , cache, extra)
decP (memC , tC ) = tS
lets us ensure that the monitor does not fault when coming in
C
C
(mem , reg , pc@tC , fpc, cache)
contact with user tags. For example, while policies will usually
CS
≈ (memS , regS , pc@tS , extra)
check the tag on the target pc every time user code performs
a Jump (which may cause faults), such checks are not needed This relation is implicitly parameterized over policy-specific
for monitor code, since we assume that it behaves correctly. decoding functions (decP , etc.) plus an invariant I, which
To allow for both behaviors, we program the monitor-specific should be chosen to ensure that (i) the symbolic machine’s
masks to always use the tag of a Jump target as the new pc tag, extra state component is correctly represented in the concrete
while disabling this bypass in the normal masks. Aside from machine memory; (ii) the monitor’s code and data are tagged
the PC and CI tags, all other positions in the iv are marked as appropriately; and (iii) the cache contains the ground rules
A concrete register file simulates a
don’t-care for all opcodes. Copy-throughs are used for keeping needed by the monitor.
C
S
C reg ) when they agree on register
symbolic
one
(reg
∼
mem
the same pc tag in most instructions and for copying the pc
tag from a register tag in the case of Jump, Jal, and JumpFpc. values and the tags decode to the corresponding symbolic tags:
Mov, Load, Store, and Jal also use copy-through for the result
∀r, x, tS , (∃tC , regC [r] = x@tC ∧ decR (memC , tC ) = tS )
tag.
⇐⇒ regS [r] = x@tS
Miss Handler Since ground rules ensure that monitor code
never faults, the miss handler is only invoked for monitoring
user-level code. The job of the miss handler is thus twofold:
(i) implement the symbolic transfer function of a micro-policy;
and (ii) enforce monitor self-protection. For the latter, the
miss handler just needs to ensure that the faulting opcode
is not a privileged instruction (e.g., AddRule), and that the
Monitor tag does not occur anywhere in the faulting iv (which,
crucially, includes the tags on the “old contents” of any registers
and memory locations that the instruction overwrites). If these
checks fail, the miss handler halts the machine. (In a real system,
the miss handler would instead tell the scheduler to halt just the
offending process.) Otherwise, the miss handler can compute
the transfer function on the iv, halting the machine if it violates
the micro-policy. If the instruction is allowed, the miss handler
should store the resulting ov into the appropriate memory slots,

The relation memC ∼ memS is defined similarly; notice that
the concrete machine can contain more registers or memory
locations than the symbolic machine, as long as the concrete
tags on these registers or locations do not encode any valid
user tag. The predicate cache ok states that, whenever a rule
with a valid user-level pc tag is found in the cache, the rule’s
result matches that of the symbolic transfer function, modulo
the tag encoding. The predicate services ok states that each
location in the concrete memory that corresponds to a monitor
service is tagged with Entry tS , where tS is that service’s tag.
4 Our formal Coq development also gives sufficient conditions for proving
forward refinement between the implementation of some policy on the concrete
machine and the corresponding symbolic machine instance. Since this is not
the focus of the present work—and since, in any case, forward refinement
between the symbolic and abstract machines doesn’t hold for all policies—we
omit the details here, referring the reader to the formal development for more
information.

Once again, we would like to construct a backward refinement inductively by using a backward simulation (Definition 4.2). However, we can’t use Definition 9.1 for this
right away, since backward refinement doesn’t hold for it
because steps taken by the concrete machine while inside the
monitor are not mapped to any steps of the symbolic machine.
Moreover, the concrete monitor will often need to temporarily
break both the invariants and the strong correspondence with
respect to some symbolic state. To address these points, we
use Definition 9.1 to define a weak simulation relation ∼CS :
Definition 9.2. sC ∼CS sS if either (i) the pc of sC has a
valid user-level tag and sC ≈CS sS , or else (ii) the pc of sC
is tagged Monitor and there exists a state sC
U with a pc that
CS S
∗ C
is a valid user-level tag such that sC
s and sC
U ≈
U → s ,
where all states in this execution have the pc tagged Monitor.
Case (ii) handles concrete states where the monitor is executing,
giving us a way to remember enough information from the
point where the monitor was invoked to be able to reestablish
strong simulation once execution returns to user mode.
Definition 9.3 ({0, 1}-backward simulation). We say that a
low-level machine (StateL , →L ) {0, 1}-backward simulates a
high-level machine (StateH , →H ) with respect to a relation ∼
H
L
L
L
H
if, whenever sL
1 ∼ s1 and s1 → s2 , either s2 ∼ s1 or there
H
H
H
L
H
exists s2 such that s1 → s2 and s2 ∼ s2 .
Theorem 9.4 (Backward CS-simulation). The concrete machine
{0, 1}-backward-simulates the symbolic machine, with respect
to ∼CS .

f (028 · 0 · 0) = Data
f (k · 0 · 1) = Key k
f (k · 1 · 1) = Sealed k

decP (m, · 1) = •
decR (m, t · 0 · 1) = f (t)
decM (m, t · 0 · 1) = User f (t)
decM (m, · 1 · 0) = Entry •

Here · is bitstring concatenation and k is a 28-bit binary
representation of a symbolic key. (Notice that our sealing tags
can be represented in a single word, so dec does not depend
on the machine memory.) The key counter on the symbolic
machine is represented concretely as a single word of monitor
memory. Implementing the transfer function is easy: we just
need to prevent certain operations (e.g., Binop) from being
performed on sealed values and keys, following the symbolic
rules presented in §4. Implementing the monitor services is also
simple. The mkkey routine increments the key counter (halting
if it would overflow) and remembers the old value k. It then
tags the return register with Key k (with a dummy payload) and
returns to user code. The seal routine checks (using GetTag)
that its first argument has the form x@Data and its second
argument is tagged Key k, assembles x@Sealed k in rret using
PutTag, and returns; unseal does the converse. All of these
routines halt if the arguments do not have the required form.
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Related Work

We have already discussed work related to specific micropolicies. Here we focus on work related to micro-policies and
reference monitors in general.

Micro-Policies The micro-policies framework and the PUMP
architecture have their roots in SAFE, a clean-slate, securityThe proof assumes the correctness of the monitor machine code
oriented architecture [12]. There, the PUMP was used only
provided by the micro-policy designer: (1) On a cache miss, if
to implement dynamic IFC; other special-purpose hardware
all the invariants are satisfied at the faulting instruction, then
mechanisms enforced properties such as memory safety [19]
the miss handler must successfully return to a user state only if
and compartmentalization [12]. Still, the PUMP design in the
the faulting tag combination is allowed by the transfer function.
SAFE system was made quite flexible, since dynamic IFC is
In this case, the resulting user state must be a refinement of
an active area of research, with various mechanisms and “label
the original symbolic state, and the cache must be updated
models” being proposed regularly, making baked-into-hardware
to allow execution to proceed. (2) When executing a monitor
solutions unattractive. A simple IFC micro-policy was studied
service, the concrete machine returns to user code only if the
formally for an idealized version of the SAFE processor [4].
corresponding symbolic monitor service allows that execution.
The present work aims to demonstrate the applicability of
In this case, the resulting user state must be a refinement of the
the PUMP beyond IFC and beyond clean-slate hardware. We
new symbolic state. (3) Monitor data structures and invariants
consider a diverse set of micro-policies and a more conventional
are not affected by updates to user memory.
architecture—a simplified RISC machine, with bit-strings as
Therefore, for any policy implemented in terms of abstract
words (instead of integers), with registers (instead of a hardware
and symbolic machines, we can get end-to-end refinement
stack), and with no separate instruction memory, no callby composing Theorem 9.4 and the policy-specific symbolicstack or memory protection, no special monitor mode with
abstract simulation, relating the abstract machine to the concrete
access to protected memory, and no special monitor invocation
machine instantiated with a correct monitor implementation.
instruction. Despite giving up these multiple specialized hardExample: Concrete Sealing Machine To implement the ware protection features, we obtain similar kinds of protection
sealing micro-policy from §4 on the concrete machine, we through more extensive use of the PUMP’s tagging features.
can represent symbolic sealing tags as follows on a concrete
The general structure of our proofs is similar to [4]; in
machine with 32-bit words, assuming that |SK| ≤ 228 and the particular, that work also proves refinement between a concrete
Monitor tag is represented by 0.5
machine and an abstract one, using a “symbolic IFC rule
machine” as an intermediate step; also, as we do here for CFI, it
5 Disclaimer: We have implemented and tested this concrete sealing microproves a generic preservation theorem that non-interference can
policy as a sanity check on our framework, but we have not formally proved
the sealing-specific assumptions supporting Theorem 9.4.
be carried to the lowest level. The rule machine in [4], however,

is merely a reformulation of an IFC abstract machine to factor
Our Coq development runs to about 17.7k lines of code,
a “rule table” (written in a simple IFC-specific domain-specific out of which 4.8k lines are generic (2.8k for the symbolic
language) out of the semantics. In contrast, our symbolic machine and the generic symbolic-concrete refinement proof)
machine is generic and is reused by all micro-policies. On and the rest specific to our four micro-policies (4.9k for comthe other hand, the proofs in [4] include the verification of partmentalization, 4.7k for CFI, 1.9k for memory safety, and
an IFC monitor at the machine code level using a framework 1.2k for dynamic sealing). Our Coq development is available
for structured code generators and a verified DSL compiler, at https://github.com/micro-policies/micro-policies-coq.
We are currently working on a micro-policy for call-stack
both specially crafted for the simple architecture used there.
Here, we chose to focus on designing a generic micro-policy protection, as well as extensions of the current policies, such
framework and on building and verifying the symbolic machine as memory protection for stack-allocated data and unboxed
instances for a diverse set of micro-policies, leaving concrete- structs. An obvious question at the level of the framework
itself is how to compose micro-policies. Certain micro-policies
level implementation and verification for later.
Another paper on the PUMP [11] proposes implementation are known to compose sensibly, and micro-architectural opoptimizations for its hardware architecture and experimentally timizations ensure that they perform well on practical workevaluates their overhead for a set of micro-policies including loads [11], but the general picture remains unclear. Another
CFI and memory safety, plus a taint-tracking micro-policy. Our obvious target for future work is formalizing the symbolic rule
work here is complementary, focusing on formal specification language that we used informally here for exposition.
Our framework currently targets a simplified ISA with a
and verification of micro-policies. Also, the micro-policies
for compartmentalization and dynamic sealing, as well as the limited instruction set, a single core, no hardware concurrency
mechanisms for monitor services and monitor self-protection or interrupts, etc. An interesting challenge is to scale our
formalization to a more realistic RISC architecture such as
described here, are new.
MIPS, Alpha, RISC-V, or ARM extended with a PUMP. Also,
Reference Monitors Reference monitors have been around we have not explicitly considered the role of the compiler
since the early seventies [3]. However, building low-overhead or loader here, although in reality their support is crucial for
enforcement mechanisms for a broad set of policies has proved some policies. For example, CFI relies on having a control-flow
challenging. Besides low overhead, Anderson’s seminal work graph, which would naturally come from a compiler, and on the
mentions a set of security requirements for reference monitors: initial tags on instructions, which would have to be added or at
“(a) The reference monitor must fully mediate all operations least vetted by the loader. We have not formalized the operating
relevant to the enforced security policy. (b) The integrity of the system or its interaction with micro-policy monitoring. Indeed,
reference monitor must be protected, either by the reference micro-policies might even live below an OS, and could then
monitor itself or by some external means. (c) The correctness help protect the OS itself from attacks. Another alternative
of the reference monitor must be assured, in part by making (discussed in [11]) is to only protect user-level code, but this
the reference monitor be small enough to analyze and test.”
would lead to a larger TCB.
Micro-policies meet all these requirements: (a) they provide
complete mediation at the level of individual instructions; Acknowledgments We are grateful to Delphine Demange,
(b) they include mechanisms for using tags to protect the Udit Dhawan, André DeHon, Greg Morrisett, Steve Zdancewic,
integrity of monitor code and data structures (§9); and (c) the and the anonymous reviewers for helpful discussions and
TCB of micro-policy monitors is generally quite small. More- thoughtful feedback on earlier drafts. This material is based
over, we achieve high confidence in the their correctness by upon work supported by the DARPA CRASH program through
formal verification of symbolic policies in Coq; in the future the US Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) under Contract
we hope also to verify low-level concrete implementations. No. FA8650-10-C-7090. The views expressed are those of the
Finally, while precisely characterizing the class of properties authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of
that can be expressed as micro-policies and efficiently enforced the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. Tolmach
by the PUMP is an interesting open problem, we know for was partly supported by a Digiteo Chair at Laboratoire de
sure that it includes very important security properties: IFC, Recherche en Informatique, Université Paris-Sud.
CFI, compartmentalization, and memory safety. Inspiration for
attacking the expressiveness question formally may come from Appendix
the work by Schneider et al. [15], [29] on execution monitors A Details of the CFI Micro-Policy
and program rewriting.
CFI Property and Attacker Model We give a generic CFI
definition that can be instantiated to all three levels of machine,
11 Conclusions and Future Work
adapting the original definition by Abadi et al. [1] to our setting.
We have presented a generic verification framework for a rich The two main technical differences are that (1) at the symbolic
class of low-level, hardware-accelerated, tag-based security level, the tag-based mechanism detects a CFI violation on the
enforcement mechanisms. The micro-policies we verify target step after it has occurred (i.e., when checking the instruction
a wide range of critical security properties, illustrating the following an illegal control transfer, rather than the instruction
power of a simple but flexible hardware mechanism.
that caused the transfer) and (2) at the concrete level, detecting

decode i = Store rp rs
reg[rp ] = p
a violation and halting the machine is a nontrivial process im[pc] = i
0
reg[r
]
=
w
dm
=
dm[p←w]
(S TORE)
s
involving missing in the hardware rule cache and running the
0
software miss handler, which eventually halts. These differences (im, dm, reg, pc, true) →n (im, dm , reg, pc + 1, true)
do not affect security (at both levels, the machine halts before Machine states contain an additional bit ok. The machine
it does anything externally visible), but they lead to a slightly executes instructions only when this bit is true; otherwise
more complex CFI definition.
it gets stuck with respect to normal steps (the attacker can
As usual [1], the definition is given with respect to an take steps at any time). Indirect jumps are checked against the
extended step relation →, which is the union of normal machine allowed set J; if the control flow is invalid the jump is taken
steps →n and attacker steps →a .The →n and →a relations but the violation is recorded by setting ok to false so that the
are parameters of the general CFI definition. The →a relation machine will now be stuck with respect to normal steps. This
represents an overapproximation of the attacker’s capabilities, behavior is designed to match rule-based enforcement at lower
allowing the attacker to change any user-level data in the system levels, thus simplifying the proofs (we can prove a 1-backward
but none of the code. At the concrete and symbolic levels, the SA-simulation instead of a {0, 1} one).
attacker will also be prevented from directly changing the tags.
im[pc] = i
decode i = Jal r
reg[r] = pc0
0
This models an attacker that can mount buffer-overflow attacks
reg = reg[ra ←pc + 1]
ok = (pc, pc0 ) ∈ J
(JAL)
but has no built-in capability for subverting our NWC, NXD,
(im, dm, reg, pc, true) →n (im, dm, reg0 , pc0 , ok)
or CFI protections (e.g., no hardware backdoor).
While the CFI micro-policy does not provide any monitor
We start by defining when a trace has CFI with respect to
services
itself, the abstract machine fully exposes (“paravirtua set of allowed indirect jumps J (a binary relation on code
alizes”)
the
lower-level monitor service mechanism—that is,
addresses). From J we can construct the complete CFG, a
the
abstract
machine can be instantiated with an arbitrary set
relation on machine states written cfg J. This involves adding
of
monitor
services.
all direct CFG edges that are clear in the code (e.g., a Nop or
get service pc = (f, ti )
Bnz can reach the next instruction; a Bnz can reach its target).
f (im, dm, reg, pc, true) = (im, dm0 , reg0 , pc0 , true)
(S VC)
Definition A.1. We say that an execution trace s0 → s1 →
(im, dm, reg, pc, true) →n (im, dm0 , reg0 , pc0 , true)
. . . → sn has CFI if (si , si+1 ) ∈ cfg J for all i ∈ [0, . . . , n)
As in all other step rules, we proceed only when the ok bit is
such that si →n si+1 .
true, which prevents monitor service calls outside the allowed
Compared to Abadi et al. [1], this definition additionally CFG.
requires that an attacker step which happens to be a valid
The step rules above capture the intuition of a machine that
normal step must also be in the CFG, which is helpful for has CFI by construction. With the exception of the rule for
proving CFI preservation. This definition is slightly stronger Load, the remaining rules are straightforward; we show just
than Abadi et al.’s; however, we instead use the following the ones for Load and Bnz:
incomparable definition, which allows a single violation in a
im[pc] = i
decode i = Load rp rs
trace, as long as the machine is “stopping” afterwards.
reg[rp ]=wp
im[wp ]=w ∨ dm[wp ]=w
reg0 = reg[rs ←w]
Definition A.2 (CFI). We say that the machine (State, init, →n ,
(L OAD)
0
→a , cfg, stopping) has CFI with respect to the set of allowed (im, dm, reg, pc, true) →n (im, dm, reg , pc + 1, true)
indirect jumps J if, for any execution starting from initial state
mem[pc] = i
decode i = Bnz r n
reg[r]=w
s0 and producing a trace s0 → . . . → sn , either (1) the whole
pc0 ← if w = 0 then pc+1 else pc+n
(B NZ)
trace has CFI according to Definition A.1, or else (2) there is
(im, dm, reg, pc, true) →n (im, dm, reg0 , pc0 , true)
some i such that si →n si+1 , and (si , si+1 ) 6∈ cfg J, where
the sub-traces s0 → . . . → si and si+1 → . . . → sn both have Notice that the Load rule allows loading a word from either
the instruction or the data memory, capturing the intuition that
CFI and the sub-trace si+1 → . . . → sn is stopping.
instructions can be loaded as data. The disjointness of the two
At the abstract and symbolic levels a trace is stopping if it memories (and thus the fact that the rule is deterministic) is
is formed only of attacker steps (→a ) between states that are guaranteed by the simulation relation between the symbolic
all stuck with respect to normal steps (6→n ). This definition and the abstract machine. The step rule for Bnz demonstrates
expresses the fact that the attacker can take steps even after a the fact that we only check indirect jumps, not direct ones, for
violation has occurred and the machine has halted with respect control-flow violations.
to normal steps. At the concrete level the attacker can even take
Proving CFI for this abstract machine is easy. We capture
steps while the machine is halting; this is discussed together the attacker’s capabilities by the following relation:
with the concrete machine for CFI.
dom dm = dom dm0
dom reg = dom reg0
0
0
(im, dm, reg, pc, ok) →A
Abstract CFI Machine The abstract machine has CFI by
a (im, dm , reg , pc, ok)
construction. It has separate instruction and data memories This allows the attacker to arbitrarily change the data memory
(im and dm); the instruction memory is fixed (NWC), and all and registers at any time. Finally, the only requirement on
executed instructions are fetched from this memory (NXD):
initial states is that the ok bit starts out true.

Theorem A.3 (Abstract CFI). This abstract machine has CFI.
Symbolic CFI Machine The symbolic micro-policy for CFI
was described in §6. For completeness, we present the rest
of the symbolic rules. The case for Jump is identical to Jal.
For the other operators (besides Jump, Jal or Store), we again
have one rule to deal with the case of a jump target...
(src, dst) ∈ J
op : (Code src, Code dst, −, −, −) → (Code ⊥, −)
... and a different one when execution did not take a jump:
op : (Code ⊥, Code

, −, −, −) → (Code ⊥, −)

A concrete trace is stopping if it has a (possibly empty) prefix
formed only of attacker steps between user states that are all
stuck with respect to user steps, followed by a (possibly empty)
suffix of monitor states. This captures either immediately
getting stuck with respect to normal steps or missing in the rule
cache, faulting into the monitor, and eventually halting without
returning from monitor mode. This definition also deals with
the fact that we allow the attacker to take steps even after a
violation has occurred but before the machine is halted (right
before the fault into the miss handler).
The cfg function is defined so that in monitor mode all
control flows are allowed. We assume that monitor code is
correct, so we do not need to enforce CFI there.

We capture the symbolic-level attacker by the relation
mem →Sa mem0
reg →Sa reg0
S
(mem, reg, wpc @tpc ) →a (mem0 , reg0 , wpc @tpc )
where the relation on memories and registers is the pointwise
extension of the following inductive relation on atoms:
w1 @Data →Sa w2 @Data

w@(Code id) →Sa w@(Code id)

This allows attackers to change words tagged Data but not
words tagged Code and not the tags themselves.
Two properties are invariant under execution: all words in
memory tagged Code addr are indeed located at address addr,
and all sources and destinations in J are tagged Code addr. A
symbolic machine state is initial if it satisfies these invariants
and the pc is tagged Data (no jump in progress).
Concrete Machine To obtain a useful result about CFI on
the concrete machine, it is not enough to simply instantiate the
generic refinement result from §9, as we do for other policies;
we must first define concrete versions of each concept used
in the statement of the CFI property. The concrete attacker is
only allowed to take steps when the machine is in user mode.
It can change memory and registers but not the contents of the
cache, the pc, or the fpc.
0
0
mem →C
reg →C
a mem
a reg
0
0
C
(mem, reg, cache, pc, fpc) →a (mem , reg , cache, pc, fpc)

The attacker relation for memories and registers directly extends
the symbolic one to the additional low-level tags
w1 @ut1 →Sa w2 @ut2
decR (m, cti ) = uti
C
w1 @ct1 →a w2 @ct2
and similarly for decM . This allows the concrete attacker to
change atoms tagged User ut for some symbolic tag ut under
the same conditions as at the symbolic level, but prevents it
from changing any other atoms (in particular monitor code,
data, and registers) or any tags. This attacker model relies
on the correctness of the monitor self-protection mechanism
from §9.
The initial states at the concrete level are defined as the
image under ≈CS
I of symbolic initial states that additionally
satisfy our symbolic invariants. This ensures that concrete
initial states satisfy both the generic low-level conditions from
§9 (Iw ) and that they respect the symbolic invariants.

Formal Results We prove CFI for the concrete machine
running a CFI monitor by transporting CFI from the abstract
machine to the symbolic and then to the concrete one using a
general CFI-preservation result.
Theorem A.4 (CFI Preservation). Given a high-level maH
H
H
chine M H = (StateH , initialH , →H
n , →a , cfg , stopping ),
L
L
L
L
L
a low-level machine M = (State , initial , →n , →a , cfgL ,
stoppingL ), a simulation relation between states sL ∼ sH , a
L
predicate checked sL
1 s2 indicating which low-level steps need
to be checked for CFI, and a set of allowed indirect jumps J,
if M H has CFI, then M L also has CFI under the following
additional assumptions:
A1. 1-backward simulation with respect to ∼ for checked steps
in →L
n;
A2. {0, 1}-backward simulation with respect to ∼ for
unchecked steps in →L
n;
A3. 1-backward simulation with respect to ∼ for attacker steps
(→L
a );
A4. if initial sL , then ∃sH so that initial sH and sL ∼ sH ;
H
L
H
L L
A5. if sL
1 ∼ s1 , s2 ∼ s2 , checked s1 s2 , then
H
L
cfg J = cfg J;
H
L
L
L L
A6. if sL
1 ∼ s1 , s1 →n s2 and ¬checked s1 s2 , then
L
L L
(s1 , s2 ) ∈ cfg J;
H
H
H H
H
A7. if sL
J, and sH
1 ∼ s1 , (s1 , s2 ) 6∈ cfg
1 →n s2 then
H
H
¬(s1 →a s2 );
H
H
L L
H H
A8. and if sL
J, and
1 ∼ s1 , checked s1 s2 , (s1 , s2 ) 6∈ cfg
H
H
L
L
H
s1 → s2 , and the trace s2 :: t refines the trace sH
2 :: t
H
with respect to simulation relation ∼, and stopping (s2 ::
L
tH ), implies that stopping (sL
2 :: t ).
Assumption A3 states that low-level attacker steps (→L
a ) are
simulated by corresponding high-level attacker steps, which
ensures that the low-level attacker is at most as strong as the
high-level one. A4 enforces that all low-level initial states can
be mapped to related high-level initial states. A5 ensures that for
checked low-level steps the two cfg functions completely agree.
A6 states that all unchecked low-level steps are allowed by cfgL
(e.g., monitor steps are allowed by the CFG). A7 states that
CFG violations are not simultaneously attacker steps. Finally,
A8 ensures that a high-level stopping trace can only be mapped
by the simulation relation to a stopping low-level trace.

Theorem A.5 (CFI Concrete). The concrete machine running a
CFI monitor satisfying the assumptions in §9 has CFI.
B

Additional Symbolic Machine Rules
mem[wpc ] = i@ti
decode i = Nop
transfer(Nop, tpc , ti , −, −, −) = (t0pc , −)

(N OP)
(mem, reg, wpc @tpc , extra) → (mem, reg, (wpc +1)@t0pc , extra)
mem[wpc ] = i@ti
decode i = Const w r
reg[r]= @t
transfer(Const, tpc , ti , t, −, −) = (t0pc , t0 )
reg0 = reg[r←w@t0 ]
(C ONST)
0
(mem, reg, wpc @tpc , extra) → (mem, reg , (wpc +1)@t0pc , extra)
mem[wpc ] = i@ti
decode i = Mov r rd
reg[r]=w@t
reg[rd ]= @td
transfer(Mov, tpc , ti , t, td , −) = (t0pc , t0d )
reg0 = reg[rd ←w@t0d ]
(M OV)
(mem, reg, wpc @tpc , extra) → (mem, reg0 , (wpc +1)@t0pc , extra)
mem[wpc ] = i@ti
decode i = Load r rd
reg[r]=w@t
mem[w] = w0 @t0
reg[rd ]= @td
transfer(Load, tpc , ti , t, t0 , td ) = (t0pc , t0d )
reg0 = reg[rd ←w0 @t0d ]
(L OAD)
(mem, reg, wpc @tpc , extra) → (mem, reg0 , (wpc +1)@t0pc , extra)
mem[wpc ] = i@ti
decode i = Jump r
0
@t
reg[r] = wpc
transfer(Jump, tpc , ti , t, −, −) = (t0pc , −)
0

(mem, reg, wpc @tpc , extra) → (mem, reg

mem[wpc ] = i@ti
decode i = Bnz r n
reg[r] = w@t
transfer(Bnz, tpc , ti , t, −, −) = (t0pc , −)
0
wpc = if w = 0 then wpc + 1 else wpc + n
0

(mem, reg, wpc @tpc , extra) → (mem, reg

(J UMP)

0
, wpc
@t0pc , extra)

(B NZ)

0
@t0pc , extra)
, wpc

mem[wpc ] = i@ti
decode i = Jal r
0
reg[r] = wpc
@t1
reg[ra ] = @tra
transfer(Jal, tpc , ti , t1 , tra , −) = (t0pc , t0ra )
reg0 = reg[ra ←(wpc +1)@t0ra ]
(JAL)
0
(mem, reg, wpc @tpc , extra) → (mem, reg0 , wpc
@t0pc , extra)
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